Reasons and first-person authority by Schroeder, Severin
Reasons and first­person authority 
Book or Report Section 
Published Version 
Schroeder, S. (2017) Reasons and first­person authority. In: 
Padilla Gálvez, J. and Gaffal, M. (eds.) Intentionality and 
Action. de Gruyter, pp. 123­138. ISBN 9783110559095 
Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/75535/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
Publisher: de Gruyter 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
  
Severin SCHROEDER 
Reasons and First-Person Authority 
1 Introduction 
Typically, an explanation of an event cites the causes that made it happen. Ac-
cording to what has been called the ‘standard view’ in the philosophy of action,1 
intentional human actions are just a subclass of events and the agent’s reasons 
are the causes of their actions. In the 1930s this widespread causalism was dis-
puted by Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose alternative view that reason-giving ex-
planations should not be seen as a type of causal explanations, held sway in the 
1960s. It was defended by Elizabeth Anscombe,2 Peter Winch,3 and A. I. 
Melden,4 but was then forcefully challenged by Donald Davidson, in his influen-
tial paper ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’,5 which by the 1970s had re-
established causalism about reasons as the standard view. The standard causal-
ist view, however, has generally been acknowledged to be troubled by a major 
problem: the problem of deviant causal chains.6 Davidson himself had con-
fessed not to be able to resolve this problem,7 yet many of his followers re-
mained more optimistic. 
A more recent causalist view, propounded for example by Carlos Moya8 and 
John Hyman,9 is that the flaw both in Davidson’s version of causalism and in the 
anti-causalism of Wittgenstein and his followers was their commitment to a 
Humean account of causation, as a law-governed relation between events. On a 
more flexible construal, Moya and Hyman argue, causalism can be defended 
against its critics. — In this paper, I shall, after a few preliminary clarifications, 
re-consider the deviant causal chain problem, with those more flexible causalist 
ideas in mind, and then try to give a defence of Wittgenstein’s key anti-causalist 
idea: first-person authority about reasons. 
|| 
1 Cf. Sandis 2009, 2. 
2 Anscombe 1957. 
3 Winch 1958. 
4 Melden 1961. 
5 Davidson 1963. 
6 Moya 1990, 114–28. 
7 Davidson 1973, 79. 
8 Moya 2014, 200–4. 
9 Hyman 2015, ch. 5. 
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2 Reasons and causes 
To begin with, let us note that reasons are not causes: the two concepts are 
categorially different. Although a thought may well be cited both as a reason 
and as a cause, this is due to a well-known ambiguity: by a thought we can 
mean either the occurrence of a thought (the mental event of thinking of some-
thing at a given moment) or the contents of the thought (what we think). Thus, 
the mental event of my thinking or remembering that I’ve run out of cash may 
be said to cause me to set off in search of a cash machine, whereas the reason I 
offer to justify my behaviour is the content of my thought: that I need some 
cash.10 It can occasionally happen that my reason for acting is not what I think, 
but the fact that a certain thought occurs to me. This is nicely illustrated by a 
pair of examples given by Hyman:11 
 (1) Roger fled to Brazil because he believed that he was being pursued by the Security 
Services. 
(2) Roger saw his doctor because he believed that he was being pursued by the Security 
Services. 
In the second case, on a natural interpretation, Roger’s action was not motivat-
ed by the contents of his belief, but by its occurrence, which he took to be 
pathological. However, even in such a case reason and cause are not identical. 
The occurrence of such irrational thoughts caused Roger to seek medical advice, 
but the reason for his action was not the (datable) occurrence of the thought, but 
the (non-datable) fact that it occurred.12 The fact that a football match lasts 90 
minutes does not itself last 90 minutes, and if a stone hit the window it is not 
the fact that a stone hit the window that hit the window (and caused it to break). 
Similarly, my thirst may have caused me to drink a whole pint, but the reason I 
did so was that I was thirsty: a fact, not a desire. 
This categorial difference between reasons and causes does of course not 
rule out a causalist construal of reason-giving explanations. But instead of say-
ing that reasons are causes, a causalist should propose, more carefully, that a 
reason-giving explanation is correct if and only if a corresponding causal claim 
is correct. For example, on the causalist view, the following two statements are 
equivalent (subject perhaps to some minor qualifications): 
|| 
10 Wittgenstein PLP, 123; Gnassounou 2014, 58. 
11 Hyman 2001, 182. 
12 Gnassounou 2014, 59. 
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(3) I went in search of a cash machine because I had run out of cash. 
(4) The thought that I had run out of cash caused me to go in search of a cash machine. 
3 The problem of deviant causal chains 
However, the causalist view faces the problem of deviant causal chains. Two 
versions of this problem need to be distinguished. 
(i) First, in the well-known examples given by Roderick Chisholm13 and Da-
vidson,14 the resulting action although caused by the right belief and desire is 
not even an intentional action. Rather, the agent’s thoughts make him nervous 
and thus cause him to bring about the envisaged action unintentionally (e.g., 
careless driving makes him inadvertently and coincidentally run over the very 
person he is thinking of murdering). This kind of case serves to highlight that 
the existence of a suitable desire-belief pair is not sufficient for the intentional 
action in question to be carried out. I may want to do it and know how to do it — 
but not be able to bring myself to do it. Therefore, causalists proceeded to insist 
that the mental cause of an intentional action must be an intention to carry out 
that action.15 
However, this modification does not overcome the deviant causal chain 
problem. Assuming for the moment that an intention is indeed a mental occur-
rence suitable for causing an action (perhaps envisaging it as a kind of decision 
to act),16 it may well lead to the action being carried out unintentionally. In 
Chisholm’s example of the homicidal driver, we can imagine that the man was 
already determined and on the way to committing the crime when his eagerness 
to carry it out made him kill his victim accidentally. It is evidently not enough 
for the intention to figure among the causes if in the end it doesn’t inform the 
action itself. As Moya puts it, in his critical discussion of Irving Thalberg’s cau-
salist theory: it is not enough that as a result of an intention an agent fulfils that 
intention; ‘the agent has to be conscious of fulfilling his intention’17. That is 
indeed the crucial point: for an action to be intentional the agent has to be 
aware of carrying it out. But this awareness is a feature of the action itself and 
|| 
13 Chisholm 1966, 29–30. 
14 Davidson 1973, 79. 
15 Brand 1984, 31–5; Thalberg 1984, 256; Stout 2010. 
16 For reasons to think otherwise, see Anscombe 1983; Rundle 1997, 197–206; and Clot-
Goudard 2015, 68–76. 
17 Moya 1990, 122. 
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not a causal factor preceding it. It is certainly possible that a plan or intention 
precedes the action, but that is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of 
intentionality. It is quite enough for the intention to be there in the act, as an 
ability I have of explaining what I’m doing. The causal preliminaries cancel out 
as conceptually irrelevant. 
(ii) Another version of the deviant causal chain problem occurs when the in-
tentionality of the action is not in question, but we want to ascertain the reason 
for which the person acted. This is the point where Davidson presents his only 
positive argument for a causalist construal of reasons. Where a person performs 
a certain action and is aware of more than one reason to do so, we need a crite-
rion by which to decide which of the reasons did in fact motivate the person to 
act. For Davidson, the only plausible criterion to single out the (actual) reason 
why somebody ϕ -ed from (potential) reasons to ϕ  is a causal link between rea-
son and action.18 But, as Davidson had to acknowledge, it is easy to think of 
cases in which an action is caused by the thought of a reason that was not the 
one for which the person acted. In a fairly common scenario, considering reason 
A may lead to the discovery of reason B which then motivates me to act. The 
thought of reason A would have caused the action, although it wasn’t the rea-
son for which I acted. An obvious response would be to demand that the re-
quired causal link between the thought of the reason and the action must not be 
indirect, but proximate.19 But that doesn’t help, for we can easily imagine that 
the proximate consideration that triggers the action provides a mere reminder or 
pretext, not the reason for which the person acts. For example, hearing a mov-
ing account of the economic difficulties of the local bicycle shop leads me to buy 
a bicycle there; yet I may have been planning to make this purchase anyway for 
selfish reasons and now I have just been reminded of this intention. Perhaps I 
do indeed like the idea of supporting a local shop, but it would never have been 
a reason for me to buy a bike had I not wanted to do so anyway. 
Others have suggested that the (thought of the) reason must be required to 
cause the action ‘in a way that is characteristic of’ acting for that reason,20 or in 
the way in which a disposition causes its manifestations.21 But it is hard to see 
how that could provide us with a criterion for deciding, in a given case, whether 
somebody acted for reason A or for reason B. One suspects that what this kind of 
uninformative restriction really amounts to is that we do not in fact rely on a 
|| 
18 Davidson 1963, 9. 
19 Thalberg 1984, 257. 
20 Stout 2010, 162. 
21 Hyman 2015, 116–127. 
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causal analysis for identifying agential reasons. Rather, when we think we know 
independently that somebody acted for reason A and not for reason B, we say 
post hoc that only (the thought of) reason A caused the action ‘in the right way’. 
In other words, causalism, unhelpfully qualified, becomes a mere postulate that 
doesn’t do any work. 
The truth is that even if somebody did specify what the ‘right’ causal path-
way was supposed to be, we know far too little about the causal pathways of our 
thoughts and desires for such a causally construed concept of an agential rea-
son to be usefully applicable. The insufficiency of our knowledge of the causal 
impact of thoughts and desires tends to be disguised by the fact that we focus 
on a few examples where the causal pathways, and the strength or weakness of 
particular desires are simply assumed to be obvious. Yet psychological causes 
are not like inner billiard balls whose paths can be followed by introspection. 
This may to some extent be the case with mental occurrences: I can, at least 
sometimes, fairly reliably report a causal succession of ideas (— how a given 
sentence reminds me of my sister — which memory in turn brings up a mental 
image of my school — which then reminds me of the book on architecture I just 
bought — which then makes me pick up that book). But dispositional phenome-
na, such as beliefs and inclinations, are not mental occurrences and so their 
effects cannot be read off their temporal position.  
 Acknowledging our ignorance in this area, Alvin Goldman suggested that 
an ‘explanation of how wants and beliefs lead to intentional acts would require 
extensive neurophysiological information’22. But for one thing, it is far from 
clear that in a case where the agent is aware of various potential reasons neuro-
physiological data could neatly decide which considerations were the principal 
cause of his action. For all we know, even thoughts that we don’t regard as rele-
vant may play an important role in the complicated causal network of our psy-
che and its underlying physiology. For another thing, our concern is not with a 
possible future concept of a reason, defined in the light of future scientific find-
ings and possibilities, but with a concept that has played a central role in our 
discourse for centuries: for as long as people have been articulate enough to 
inquire about and explain their behaviour to each other. Clearly, relying on 
criteria that remain either unspecified or that we are in fact unable to apply, 
causalism fails to offer a plausible analysis of this everyday concept. 
|| 
22 Goldman 1970, 62. 
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4 Reasons and first-person authority 
At the core of Wittgenstein’s distinction between reasons and causes lies the 
idea that the grammar of the former is characterised by first-person authority: 
…a person does not generally know the causes of his activities. …he will frequently be mis-
taken in specifying the cause. Strangely enough, he cannot be mistaken in specifying his 
reason. … That is, we call the reason that which he gives as his reason. The cause of an ac-
tion is established by observation, namely hypothetically, i.e., in such a way that further 
experiences can confirm it or contradict it.23 
John Hyman sees in this (and a similar passage in BB 15) only the claim that 
causal explanations are conjectures, whereas we are immediately certain of our 
reasons,— to which he rightly objects that causal statements can be certain and 
immediate too.24 In fact, that is something Wittgenstein himself remarked and 
illustrated by the example of being startled by suddenly seeing a light: in which 
case one does not hypothesise on the basis of repeated observations about the 
cause of one’s bodily movement, but is immediately aware of that cause.25 So it 
is indeed inaccurate to say that ‘one can only conjecture’ the cause (as Wittgen-
stein does in BB 15), but that is not his main point. 
The crucial contrast is not between immediate knowledge and mere conjec-
ture based on repeated observation, but between, on the one hand, an authority 
conferred by our concepts (hence not really a matter of knowledge at all) and, 
on the other hand, any kind of empirical finding, be it immediate perception or 
a tentative conjecture. In the latter case there is an independent state of affairs 
of which I come to know, be it step by step through repeated observation or 
immediately. Either way, my cognition is fallible. Error may by highly unlikely 
or even practically impossible, but extraordinary circumstances that would 
prove my judgement erroneous are at least conceivable. Thus, it is at least imag-
inable that the car I see right in front of me in broad daylight proves to be an 
ingeniously constructed hologram. Similarly, when I suddenly see a light or a 
face and startle, it is conceivable (however far-fetched and unlikely) that my 
startling reflex was triggered by some electrodes in my brain quite independent-
ly of what I happened to see at that moment.  
|| 
23 Wittgenstein VW, 109–11. 
24 Hyman 2015, 118. 
25 Wittgenstein CE, 408. 
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By contrast, first-person authority does not underwrite reports about inde-
pendent occurrences, but marks certain kinds of sincere avowals of a person’s 
impression as constitutive of a certain concept. Thus, when I can sincerely com-
plain that something feels painful to me, then — by definition or by grammar — 
it is painful. This concept of feeling does not allow any room to a distinction 
between appearance and reality; that is, error in this case is logically impossi-
ble. (Not because I know so reliably whether I’m in pain, but simply because 
this is not really a case of knowledge at all.26) 
Beliefs and preferences provide other examples of first-person authority. 
Whereas my considered opinions and long-term preferences may require some 
working out (researching and weighing of evidence, testing how different things 
agree with me), there are also concepts of current belief and spontaneous pref-
erence that capture how things appear to me and what I am inclined to choose 
at a given moment. There, again, error is logically excluded. If I can sincerely 
say that I don’t think Arsenal will win the Champions League and that I’d like to 
have a cup of tea now, then that is ipso facto what I believe and what I want at 
that moment. 
Similarly, according to Wittgenstein, there is a concept of a person’s reason 
that is simply constituted, by that person’s possible sincere avowal of his rea-
son. Not because we take people to be so reliable at finding out what their rea-
sons are, but because a reason (in this sense), unlike a cause, is not an inde-
pendent occurrence at all: it is simply defined to be what an agent can honestly 
say in response to the question: ‘Why are you doing it?’. Thus, Wittgenstein’s 
account offers a straightforward solution to the problem that stymied Davidson: 
the problem of identifying the reason for which somebody acted. 
To see more clearly how first-person authority is built into our concept of an 
agential reason, consider the concept of an intentional action. Intentional ac-
tions are a subclass of conscious voluntary actions. They are ‘actions that are 
chosen either as ends in themselves or as means to some other ends’.27 The im-
portant thing to note is that to be conscious of an intentional action — to know 
what it is one is doing — is to be conscious or aware of its intentional character-
istics, which make it the action it is. In the case of an intentional action, to be 
aware what one is doing must include being aware that one is doing it as an end 
in itself or as a means to some other end. In other words, it conceptually in-
cludes an awareness of one’s reasons, i.e. first-person authority.  
|| 
26 Wittgenstein PI, § 246; Schroeder 2006, 208–10. 
27 Kenny 1989, 45. 
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Why, for example, am I pushing a plastic card into a slot and pressing a few 
buttons? My reason for doing so (— I’m making a payment, buying a bicycle, 
with which I’d like to go on weekend bike rides —) is an essential characteristic 
of my very action. Instead of ‘Why are you pressing those buttons?’ one might 
just as well ask: ‘What are you doing there pressing those buttons?’. My reason 
is not just describing the preliminaries that led to the action (as causalism sug-
gests), it characterises the action itself. If I weren’t able to explain my action’s 
intentional features (by either giving a reason or, less likely, saying that I 
thought pressing buttons was worthwhile in itself), then it just wouldn’t qualify 
as an intentional action. It might just be a kind of fidgeting. 
Note that first-person authority in giving one’s reasons — as all kinds of 
first-person authority — is strictly speaking only a matter of present tense. That 
as an intentional agent I can authoritatively say what I am engaged in doing 
does obviously not guarantee the truth of my (sincere) descriptions of my past 
actions. However, with regard to one’s actions in the recent past where, given 
ordinary human memory capacities, one can be trusted to remember the rele-
vant circumstances of the situation, first-person authority is also granted retro-
spectively. That is because, as long as a person’s views and preferences haven’t 
changed, we can assume that the justification he offers now is probably not 
much different from the one he would have offered at the time of the action.  
Giving an explanation of one’s recent action is to perform another action, 
often manifesting the same want and belief as the original action. To explain 
one’s verbal utterance is normally a matter of paraphrasing or supplementing it. 
‘It’s a disgrace!’ —?— ‘I mean: it’s very unfair that he got sacked after all he has 
done for the company.’ In this case the philosophical question as to the virtual 
infallibility of an agent’s explanation of his action is easily answered. Action 
and explanation are on the same footing. In both cases the person speaks his 
mind; and there is no puzzle about our ability to say repeatedly what we think 
about a subject, being a little more explicit the second time. 
There are similar pairs of actions in the non-verbal sphere. Suppose you see 
Fanny Robin throwing a snowball against a wall, and ask yourself: ‘What on 
earth did she do that for?’ Then you see her throwing another snowball against 
a first-floor window, and you understand that that is what she was trying to do 
the first time: hit the window to attract someone’s attention. The second action 
explains the first by pursuing the same purpose more expediently, and thus 
more evidently. 
Now consider the case where being asked for her reason after the first throw 
she explains: ‘I want to hit that window to attract Sergeant Troy’s attention’. Her 
ability correctly to give her reasons ceases to look puzzling if we see this kind of 
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case as a variation upon the preceding ones. Action and explanation are simply 
two actions manifesting the same intention (e.g. to attract someone’s attention) 
and the same belief (e.g. that it can be done by throwing a snowball against a 
window). Given that she can speak, her ability to say for what reason she acted 
is not more surprising than her ability to repeat the action. 
Here we have an illustration of how giving one’s reason is not a matter of 
describing what happened in one’s mind. One only has to express truthfully 
what one wants and believes (or knows) in the matter. Of course, things are a 
little different if one’s wants or beliefs are no longer the same. Once Fanny Rob-
in has succeeded in hitting the window and thus attracted Sergeant Troy’s at-
tention, she will no longer have a want to do so. Hence, explaining her own 
behaviour will no longer be merely a matter of expressing a current want and 
belief. But even then no more is required of her than a sincere expression of her 
inclinations, only in a conditional form: ‘If I hadn’t yet succeeded in hitting the 
window, what would I want to do?’ Again, the answer that will explain her ac-
tion need not draw on any mental events she might remember; she only has to 
express truthfully her present inclinations to say what under such circumstanc-
es she would want to achieve and believe to be achievable by the behaviour in 
question. 
However, when it comes to explaining our behaviour months or years ago 
we are obviously fallible. I may not remember what my wants, interests and 
plans were a few months ago, so that the reasons I now attribute to myself retro-
spectively may not be the ones I had at the time (as others remembering my 
earlier explanations may know). And we are also fallible with respect to the 
history and development of our long-term intentions and reasons. Past inten-
tions that led to an action over a longer period of time need not be part of the 
intentional characteristics of the action itself. — Suppose pity with the plight of 
our local bicycle shop owner gives me the idea of supporting him by buying a 
bike, even though I never had any thoughts of using a bicycle. But once I decid-
ed on buying a bike from him, I naturally started thinking what I could do with 
it. The idea of weekend bike rides arose and pleased me so much that by the 
time of the purchase I regard it as the only reason for my action. It may be that 
I’ve forgotten the original motive of compassion, but it may also be that I regard 
it as a change of mind: two months ago I might have bought a bike in order to 
support the shop, but now I don’t feel particularly concerned about the shop-
keeper anymore and give only my weekend plans as my reason. The original 
reason figures in the causal history of my action, but is not the reason for which 
I acted. 
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5 The ‘real’ reason 
There are various situations in which we are not satisfied with the reasons given 
by an agent for their action, situations in which we are likely to dig deeper for 
(what we may be inclined to call) the ‘real’ reason. Does that contradict Witt-
genstein’s account of first-person authority about reasons? — Five kinds of cas-
es can be distinguished: 
5.1 People can be dishonest about their reasons 
It often happens that one suspects a person’s stated reason not to be their real 
reason, simply because they may not have been entirely honest. Such suspi-
cions are typically based on a perceived inconsistency between the reason stat-
ed and the views and preferences the person manifested by their behaviour on 
other occasions. For example, a ruthlessly selfish businessman’s donations to 
charity may be suspected to be given merely for prudential reasons, to improve 
his image, even if he solemnly declares that he only wanted to alleviate suffer-
ing. That is straightforward and in no way in conflict with the view that reasons 
are what agents can truthfully present as their reasons.  
But is it not possible that even a sincere statement of one’s reasons is con-
tradicted by one’s behaviour? Here two kinds of cases need to be distinguished. 
First, an intentional action and the reasons it involves may, of course, be out of 
character. Human characters are rarely entirely homogenous. Even a money-
grabbing egoist may have moments of altruistic generosity. Secondly, we could 
try to imagine a more serious inconsistency. Suppose somebody is honestly 
convinced to act for a reason, a belief, which his surrounding behaviour shows 
him not to have. For example, Jones turns down the music at 11 pm in order not 
to disturb the neighbours — although his knowledge that the neighbours are 
away is shown by the fact that he regularly enters their flat to feed the cat and 
water the flowers during their absence. Even that would not be particularly 
uncommon, as the knowledge may have momentarily slipped his mind, so that 
when turning down the music he was indeed sincerely concerned not to disturb 
the neighbours. If, however, we assume that the two contradictory beliefs are 
being manifested more or less simultaneously, the ascription of either becomes 
problematic. The person’s behaviour, verbal or non-verbal, would just be too 
confused for our concepts of belief and reason to get a firm foothold. A certain 
consistency in our verbal and non-verbal expressions of beliefs has to be pre-
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supposed for it to be possible to attribute reasons to people, just as it is a pre-
condition of our attributing beliefs to them. 
5.2 People can be unclear about their reasons 
I may feel unable to give a clear answer to the question why I bought a bike. I 
may be aware of a number of reasons — considerations speaking in favour of it 
that I find plausible — without being prepared to single out one of them as deci-
sive. Then it just has to be accepted that there is no single reason why I did it. 
5.3 Agential reasons can be (patently) erroneous 
As Jonathan Dancy puts it: reasons are non–factive.28 The reason for which I 
acted may be that p (e.g., that the bicycle I bought was of good quality) — even 
if it is not in fact the case that p (— I was wrong in thinking that the bicycle was 
of good quality). In such a case, where the agent is mistaken, or even deluded, 
our interest may well shift from a reason-giving explanation to a causal expla-
nation. Yet it would be a conflation of categories to say that, in such a case, the 
unknown cause was the agent’s ‘real reason’.  
For an example of such a conflation, consider the following psychological 
experiment:29 
...passers-by were invited to evaluate items of clothing – four different nightgowns in one 
study (378 subjects) and four identical pairs of nylon stockings in the other (52 subjects). 
Subjects were asked to say which article of clothing was the best quality and, when they 
announced a choice, were asked why they had chosen the article they had. There was a 
pronounced left-to-right effect, such that the rightmost object in the array was heavily 
chosen. For the stockings, the effect was quite large, with the right-most stockings being 
preferred over the leftmost by a factor of almost four to one. When asked about the rea-
sons for their choices, no subject ever mentioned spontaneously the position of the article 
in the array.30 
The psychologists Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson interpret this to show 
that people tend to be ignorant of the real reasons of their actions.31 But, as Con-
|| 
28 Dancy 2000, 134. 
29 I owe this example to Constantine Sandis 2015. 
30 Nisbett and Wilson 1977, 233. 
31 Nisbett and Wilson 1977, 249. 
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stantine Sandis has pointed out,32 Nisbett and Wilson just fail to distinguish two 
different concepts: that of an agent’s reason — what the agent is prepared to 
offer as a justification of his action — and that of the causal factors influencing 
an action.  
The conflation is partly due to the fact that the word ‘reason’ can also be 
used to denote a cause (rather than an agential reason). Thus it is perfectly ac-
ceptable to say: 
(5) The reason that so many subjects chose those nylon stockings is that they were placed 
in the rightmost position. 
Just as one can plausibly say: 
(6) The reason that he proposed to her that night was that he was drunk. 
Here, instead of ‘the reason’ one could also say: ‘what explains the fact’. By 
contrast, an agential reason would be indicated by prefacing the word with a 
possessive pronoun (their reason, his reason). Yet it would take a very odd char-
acter to make the following statement true: 
(6a) His reason for proposing to her that night was that he was drunk. 
It is much more probable that the man’s reason for proposing to the lady in 
question was that he thought her a desirable wife, while the drunkenness just 
allowed him to overcome his usual shyness; or alternatively, it may have cloud-
ed his judgement. In the first case, the drunkenness caused him to act on his 
reason; in the second case, the drunkenness induced him to have a new (and 
probably ill-judged) reason (namely, to find the lady suitable as a wife). 
Similarly, consumer psychology cunningly identifies causal factors, such as 
location or packaging, that make people believe certain products to be of supe-
rior quality. The reason for their choice, then, is what they mistakenly belief — 
not the marketing trick that caused them to have such a belief. Again, the fol-
lowing would describe a rather odd scenario: 
(5a) Miss Jones’s reason for choosing those nylon stockings was that they were placed on 
the extreme right. 
|| 
32 Sandis 2015, § 3. 
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We would be entitled to ask her why she thought that it was preferable to take 
stockings from the right side of the shelf. (Is she superstitious? Or has she heard 
of a convention that that is where shopkeepers tend to put the best products?) 
In short, what psychologists, such as Nisbett and Wilson, show is not that 
people are mistaken about their reasons, but simply that they are often ignorant 
of the causes of their having, and acting on, certain reasons. That what they 
believe and take as their reason is false — that they have been duped into be-
lieving it by factors unknown to them — doesn’t mean that it isn’t their real 
reason. It only means that in such a case the reason-giving explanation itself 
stands in need of a (further) explanation, which is likely to be a causal explana-
tion. For given the falsity of the reason (that in fact the preferred stockings were 
not of better quality), we want to know why the agent held such a false belief. 
5.4 The action to be explained was not in fact voluntary. 
The most extreme cases of delusional reasons (‘confabulation’) are those that 
involve post-hypnotic action. Wittgenstein considers the following case:33 
The experimental subject, who has under hypnosis been given a particular task to exe-
cute, e.g. to put up his umbrella, does precisely this — but has no inkling why he does 
what he does; asked to account for it, he may well invent a motive — ‘I wanted to check 
that the umbrella is in good shape’, and believe in it perfectly sincerely; all the same he is 
mistaken.34 
However, what according to Wittgenstein the experimental subject is mistaken 
about is the cause of his action, not his reason.35 The action was not caused by a 
preceding thought that the umbrella might be defective, yet we can still accept 
his stated reason as the best justification of his behaviour he can think of. Of 
course, under the circumstances, we are not much interested in such a justifica-
tion, since we know that his behaviour wasn’t voluntary. What he gave us may 
still be regarded as his reason – but what he did was not his intentional action, 
nothing that could be explained by the agent’s reason. What happened here 
was, in fact, the hypnotist’s doing, and so we might be more interested in the 
hypnotist’s reason for it. 
|| 
33 It should be noted that in this passage Wittgenstein uses the word ‘Motiv,’ translated as 
‘motive’, for ‘what somebody specifies as a reason for his action’ Wittgenstein VW, 424–5. 
34 Wittgenstein VW, 424–5. 
35 Wittgenstein VW, 424 f. 
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(v) Agential reasons may be found insufficient to justify the action (even in 
light of the agent’s views and preferences). 
There are certain cases of self-deception where the agential reason given is 
not false or deluded, but does not appear sufficiently strong to justify the action.  
Of course somebody’s reasons can appear feeble to us simply because we 
don’t share their views and preferences. I should never regard the concert of a 
Heavy Metal Band in London as a good reason for going there, but I should not 
for that matter question others’ explanation that that was their reason for going 
to London taking into account that they may have weird tastes in music. But 
there are other cases where a stated reason appears insufficiently weighty even 
by the agent’s own ideas and standards.  
I may, for example, sincerely give as a reason for my telling someone off his 
lack of politeness. Yet a careful observer who knows me sufficiently well realiz-
es that the occasion was fairly trivial and that I would never have lost my tem-
per so much, had it not been for the fact that I felt jealous of the person I told 
off, perhaps without being clear about it myself. Here, again, a reason sincerely 
offered by the agent is not to be contradicted. The reason for my action was 
indeed the one I gave (always assuming my sincerity, which might require that I 
reflect carefully on my relevant views and beliefs). However, since my behav-
iour was less under my control than I believed, my behaviour could not be fully 
accounted for by my reason. Part of it (the inappropriate vehemence of my out-
burst) could only be explained causally: by my being carried away by an emo-
tion I hadn’t yet fully taken stock of. 
The domain of reason-giving explanations is reasonable behaviour. Hence, 
to the extent to which an action is unreasonable we will look for a causal expla-
nation, to supplement, or in some cases even to replace the reason-giving ex-
planation. 
6 Conclusion 
As argued, following Wittgenstein’s ideas, it is a mistake to think that reason-
giving explanations are just agents’ attempts at causal explanations. The con-
cept of an agential reason is crucially different from that of a cause (— just as a 
person’s avowal of how much they value something must not be misconstrued 
as their attempted estimate of the thing’s objective monetary value).  Neverthe-
less, many reasons can also be said to identify causes. I stopped because the 
traffic lights turned red. That is my reason, but it is equally correct to say that 
the red lights caused me to stop. Again, if I develop a desire to own an Opel 
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Insignia this desire may lead (cause) me to buy such a car; yet I may also give as 
the reason for my purchase that I desired to own such a car. 
The upshot of Wittgenstein’s account is not that reasons cannot refer to 
causal factors, but merely that the concept of a reason is not the concept of a 
cause. Due to this conceptual difference, there is considerable overlap, but no 
complete correspondence between reason-giving and causal explanations of an 
action. That is, for one thing, because not all reasons refer to independently 
existing psychological occurrences or states.36 The second fact responsible for 
divergences between the two concepts is the one discussed in this paper, name-
ly that reasons, unlike causes, are covered by first-person authority. It means 
that although I may be infallible in giving certain facts or circumstances as a 
reason for my action, I do not enjoy the same infallibility with respect to the 
causes of my behaviour. Although normally when I stop in front of a red traffic 
light, the red light provides both the reason and the cause for my stopping, it is 
conceivable that my stopping had different causes: perhaps I hallucinated the 
traffic lights or it was something else (say, hypnosis) that caused me to brake. In 
such a case I would still be correct to give the red lights as my reason for stop-
ping. 
But first-person authority is relevant not only in cases of misperception or 
error. It also allows the agent to single out circumstances as decisive from a 
justificatory point of view when they play only a minor role, or perhaps no role 
at all, from a causal perspective; while, on the other hand, an observed circum-
stance that was causally crucial, getting the action under way, may rightly not 
be regarded by the agent as his reason for acting.37 
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